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PERU LOOKS TOWARD THE ELECTIONS OF 1962

by Richard W. Patch

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Progress . . . ?

One of the shocking aspects of the Latin American political scene is the suddenness with which an apparently stable, well-run, democratic nation can collapse into chaotic totalitarianism. It has happened many times in the hemisphere, most spectacularly with the fall of 19th-century "constitutional" governments and the rise of 20th-century dictators backed by modern armies.

Today, aside from Cuba which nearly monopolizes our hemispheric attention in this crisis-oriented world, there is a feeling of some satisfaction in the progress of Latin America toward stability and democracy. It has been given voice by Adolf Berle, enumerating the end of dictatorships from Argentina to (this was in Castro's early days) Cuba. It has been documented by Tad Szulc in Twilight of the Tyrants,[1] which details the lives, times, and demises of Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela, Pinilla in Colombia, Vargas in Brazil, Perón in Argentina, and Odría in Peru.

These are precariously hopeful times--when one thinks of the governments of Arturo Fron-

[1] Szulc, Tad. Twilight of the Tyrants. New York: Henry Holt, 1959.

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dizi in Argentina, Rómulo Betancourt in Venezuela, Alberto Lleras Camargo in Colombia, Janio Quadros in Brazil, Jorge Alessandri in Chile, and the combination of President Manuel Prado and Premier Pedro Beltrán in Peru. These men have inspired confidence, and confidence has led to hope that the order they have imposed or are beginning to impose on the economic and political situations of their countries will grow into a tradition of stability and democracy.

But looking a bit more deeply into one of these countries we will see once again that hope must be tempered with reason, confidence with prudence. Peru is girding itself for presidential elections still a year away. No reasonable person is making any predictions other than that the campaign will be bitterly fought and the unexpected will probably happen. The Government "party" will fight to continue its economic policies which have slowed inflation and benefited capital. Apra[2] will be forced to decide whether it will continue its coalition with a group which has lost the support of the masses or whether, for the first time in 30 years, it will run its own candidate. Individualist Fernando Belaunde Terry, narrowly defeated in 1956, is again running hard and promising a "revolution" if he is "again" defeated by election frauds. And ex-President General of Division Manuel A. Odría, whom Szulc classed with Perón, Vargas, Pinilla, and Pérez Jiménez, has triumphantly returned to Peru after five years of self-exile to attempt to regain the office he relinquished in 1956. The campaign will shake the country, and the growing question at the back of the mind of many serious observers is: how much shaking can the country take?

In Lima it is difficult to talk to Peruvians of the upper classes for more than a few minutes before they broach their fear of a total revolution, one as sweeping as that of Cuba or Bolivia. They are aware that Lima is not Peru; that television, steel and glass buildings, and a stable exchange rate do not compensate for the unbelievably anachronistic land tenure patterns of the sierra. Modern Lima does not compensate for wage rates of 50 cents a day on the coastal plantations. Even in Lima itself a tenth of the population live in squatter slums of single-room mat shacks without water. In one, "El Montón" (The Heap), men, women, and children live by raking through the city's garbage dumped each day at their doorstep. Manuel Prado (or rather his family) has built a sparkling new international airport--with cement furnished by family interests and with every contract firmly controlled by that branch of his family which dominates the huge Popular Bank of Peru--but he has made little progress toward solving the fundamental problems of land, housing, employment, and a living wage for those ready and willing to work for them.

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[2] The most common abbreviation of American Popular Revolutionary Alliance, now officially Partido Aprista Peruano, sometimes shortened to "PAP."

The Dangers of Latin American Political Taxonomy

In ordinary terms the Prado Government defies classification. The confusion began in 1956 when essentially conservative Prado made a pre-election pact with the supposedly radical and mass-based Apra party, which succeeded in electing Prado. Apra was then once again recognized as a legal party and several Apristas were appointed to Prado's cabinet. Prado exercised little initiative, leaving much of the policymaking to his cabinet. The cabinet, headed by a succession of premiers, was unsuccessful in coping with a mounting economic crisis. Its solution was to increase the amount of currency in circulation which naturally led to inflation and a rapidly falling exchange rate. Pedro Beltrán, then outside the Government, exercised his position of editor and proprietor of La Prensa to attack Government policies, adopting as his cartoon symbol the "Little Machine"--the printing press the Government was using to cure its financial difficulties. The situation became critical: public demonstrations against Prado increased [see Setback for Democracy (RWP-1-'58), an AUFS publication], and the Peruvian sol which had long been stable at 19 to the dollar dropped through the 20's and one frantic day in June 1959 hit a bottom of 31 to the dollar. Prado shrewdly turned the tables on Beltrán by appointing him Premier and Minister of Economic Affairs. The Government became a three-cornered puzzle of Prado, Apra, and Beltrán.

Beltrán himself is a complex man. Outside the country he is considered a liberal, and deservedly so for such statements as he made recently at the University of California at Los Angeles. After speaking of the inspiration which the Latin American republics have found in the example of the United States and rejecting the revolutionary principles of the Soviet Union and of Castro's Cuba, he continued:

> But let us not play with words. The word "revolution" can have a completely different sense. It can mean the governments of Latin America taking greater responsibilities. It can mean the formation, within our countries, of a democratic climate which stimulates young men and rewards the desire for public service. It can mean equality and the abolition of privileges. It can mean a greater willingness for social co-operation on the part of landowners, businessmen, and union leaders. It can mean a more intensive and complete educational system and greater opportunities for young men and women. It can mean ample civil liberties and bold economic development, prudent fiscal administration and decisive steps in housing, agrarian reform, highways and industry, science and health. It can mean higher living standards. And such advances may well be called "revolutionary" in many areas of our hemisphere.[3]

But within Peru most people would consider Beltrán a conservative. The paradox is partly explained by Beltrán's graduation from the London School of Economics in 1918. He retains many of the liberal sentiments of that day, but his sense of fiscal responsibility far transcends his desire for social programs which might endanger that responsibility. Thus, his first action on assuming the Premiership was to curb inflation by discouraging wage increases, letting prices seek their level, and taking measures to raise the exchange rate. Fiscal responsibility came to mean belt-cinching austerity for the already underprivileged mass of urban poor.

His economic reforms have encouraged more capital investment in Peru, but considering present wage rates the benefits to workers are slight in comparison with returns to investors. The encouragement has occasionally been rather direct. For example the Government made it virtually impossible for ethical drug firms to import drugs, or for physicians to prescribe drugs not manufactured in Peru. Then, on March 19, Beltrán's newspaper headlined that 46 foreign companies had requested licenses to manufacture drugs in Peru, with an initial investment of $3 million--without mentioning the reason they were forced to make the investment.

Beltrán has made a start in housing and agrarian reform. He has directed the establishment of building and loan associations, which, however, have been attacked as giving unusual advantages to the investors and slight guarantees to the home builder. Until now all of Beltrán's housing plans have resulted in little construction, particularly compared with the large amount being invested in office buildings and luxury apartments which are considered a safe and profitable form of private investment.

His start in agrarian reform consists of a bill before the Legislature. There is practically no chance it will be acted upon in the Prado administration, and most people believe Beltrán would prefer to undertake the reform in an administration in which he was himself President. In all events, and despite the many years Beltrán has devoted to the subject, the proposed reform is greatly weakened by confusing colonization with land distribution. The Premier obviously hopes to avoid distribution of existing properties, no matter how inefficiently managed by absentee owners, but would solve the problem by resettling landless persons on unoccupied land of the montaña, or tropical rain forests of eastern Peru. It is difficult to believe this could be the solution to the problem of the sierra Indians who are immobilized by traditions dating from before the conquest, and who are held to their usufruct plots of land by the system of latifundio which has dictated their economic life since colonial times.

Thus, in the Peruvian puzzle, Beltrán has a firm conservative hand on

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[3] My translation of the Spanish text which appeared in La Prensa, March 23, 1961. It may differ in minor respects from the original English text.

the reins of government. Prado is publicly little more than a ceremonial figure. And Apra is being dragged into a position increasingly repugnant to those of its members who still adhere to the original radical doctrines of founder Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre. While Beltrán has endeared himself to those who place fiscal responsibility above all else, and to much of the West for his reasoned and reasonable statements, he has also made himself, in his own words, "the most hated man in Peru."

The Dictator Who Wouldn't Fade Away

By way of striking contrast, on April 16 I watched the overwhelmingly enthusiastic reception of a man who for seven years and nine months was tsar of Peru, who trampled underfoot the idea of rule by law, who jailed and exiled his political opponents (including, briefly, Pedro Beltrán), drove Apra underground, made it dangerous to mention the word Apra publicly in any connection, drastically abridged civil liberties, and introduced economic reforms that brought prosperity to the nation.

General Manuel Odría chose Piura, on the north Peruvian coast, for his first major campaign effort outside Lima. It was well chosen. Hundreds of people began to gather at the airport early in the day, and by the time his regular commercial Peruvian airlines plane arrived in the early afternoon the approach to the reception building, the building itself, and the apron outside were jammed with between 7,000 and 9,000 cheering partisans. The cheering increased as he stepped from the plane, and when he reached the ground he was lifted on the shoulders of an eager band and borne slowly through the mass of humanity. Everyone wanted a close view of the man who now appeared a hero. As the throng passed through the wide doors of the reception building windows were smashed, and one man was pushed to the floor and rolled himself behind a lounge to avoid being trod upon. I was pressed to the wall and even the radio announcer who intrepidly thrust himself into the center found himself driven back again before Odría could say more than a few words into the microphone. Emerging from the front of the building, with more splintered glass, the waiting mass of workers again took up the cry of "Vi-va O-drí-a!"

It was an amazing sight to see the welcome accorded a man whose despotic power had not been based on his appeal to labor unions, like Juan Perón's, or to the middle class and the underpriviledged, like Fidel Castro's, but had been based squarely on the army and the small wealthy class. But the welcome was genuine, as it had been in Lima on his first arrival, and came from all classes, from the very poor to the rich.

It is impossible to believe that the enthusiasm was inspired by personal magnetism or by memories of his good works. Odría is on the short side, middle-aged, round-faced, somewhat thinner than in his Presidential

days but still paunchy, with a slight limp from a bone broken in 1956, and boasting little oratorical ability. During his administration he built a number of hospitals, schools, housing units, roads, and irrigation projects. But the most substantial work which he provided for the Piura area was the Quiroz irrigation system. This, despite declarations that it was intended for small landholders, passed into the hands of the few very wealthy men who own enormous haciendas in the Department of Piura. The peons remained as before.

Obviously the demonstration was in many ways a protest against the present Government. Prices have risen sharply during the Prado administration, wages have not. Rice, which is as much of a staple as bread in the coastal diet, was once produced in large quantities in Piura. It is now imported from the United States and Peru's archfoe, Ecuador. Everywhere there is a feeling that nothing is being done. The Piuraños share the belief that Odría is a man who did things, and he has seized on this for his slogan, "Hechos no palabras" ("Deeds not words"). He is a man to be reckoned with in 1962, and the Government candidate, whoever he may be, will be in trouble.

Some Active and Prospective Candidates

Peru looks, somewhat apprehensively, toward its elections with a full stable of candidates whose colors are mixed and murky, probably not to come clear until after the race is run. Peru has only one party in the sense North Americans and Europeans understand the word. Only Apra has a tradition, a set of doctrines, a body of ideas which are accepted by the candidate. The other "parties" are ad hoc personal organizations established by a single man to advance his way to the presidency. Such are Popular Action (AP) of Fernando Belaunde, National Odría Union (UNO), and Prado's Democratic Peruvian Movement (MDP). A minor exception is the party of the Christian Democrats, strong mainly in the south of Peru, which is unified by a basic idea of anti-Aprismo and anticommunism. But the problem remains of attempting to divine just what the various candidates stand for.

The declared candidates are:

Fernando Belaunde (Popular Action)
Manuel Odría (National Odría Union)

Possible candidates are:

Pedro Beltrán (Coexistence: Pradismo and Apra)
Manuel Seoane (Aprista)
Hernando de Lavalle (No party, Odría's chosen candidate in 1956)
Carlos Carrillo Smith (Pradista)

The best way of appreciating their political complexions is to examine

their standing according to the basic facts of Peruvian political life. These facts are (1) the mass vote; (2) votes controlled by large aggregates of capital; (3) the army; (4) the organized Aprista vote. On page 8, I have tried to sketch the main lines of support of the candidates by these power blocs. Just as important are the lines of antipathy between the various blocs and candidates. At present there is no mass support for Beltrán, Lavalle, or Carrillo Smith. The army is strongly anti-Apra and it is inconceivable that the army would support an Aprista candidate such as Seoane. In fact there is doubt as to whether the army would maintain its present political aloofness and allow an elected Aprista candidate to take office. The army has no reason to support Belaunde, but with its connections to capital so strong it might possibly be brought to bolster the positions of Beltrán, Lavalle, or Carrillo. The only candidate who appears to draw a wide spectrum of support is Odría, but his position is not as strong as it appears in the diagram for two reasons. First, although he has some mass support, it has not been tested and is probably greatly inferior to Belaunde's. Second, Odría's implacable persecution of the Apristas for seven years has won the undying hatred of rank-and-file Apra members. The only organized political force in the country is violently opposed to him. It is impossible to deny the possibility of the Aprista leaders making a pact with anyone, even Odría, but should they do this they would have to work far harder preserving party discipline than they did after their pact with Prado.

Belaunde is probably in a stronger position than I have drawn. His mass appeal, after weakening because of his postelection antics, seems to be strengthening once more. He has been particularly active in the provinces. He has kept a careful silence about his position with respect to Apra, and thus preserves a strong bargaining position.

But, once again, the crucial point is that these candidates are personalities, not representatives of political parties. We can be confident that on election day not all of these candidates will be in the field competing with one another for votes. Much of the campaign will be a long attempt to consolidate a position of enough strength to permit the formation of alliances on favorable terms. These alliances are usually concluded as near the election date as possible. Thus predictions of surviving candidates, much less the winning candidate, based on reasonable party behavior and strength, are impossible.

Apra is one of the main question marks. This, the only organized group of voters, has not presented its own candidate since 1931. Yet one of the conditions of the 1956 pact with Prado was that Apra could present its own candidate--an Apra member--for the presidency in 1962. Many believe that it will do so, and there is much dispute whether the candidate will be the well-known and highly controversial Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre or a less controversial figure of the second rank such as Manuel Seoane. But Peruvians opposed to Apra are fanatic in their opposition. An elected Apra President could provoke army intervention, or, at best, a fratricidal political at-


CANDIDATES
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MASS
BELAUNDE
APRA
BELTRÁN
SEOANE
LAVALLE
ARMY
ODRÍA
CARRILLO
CAPITAL

mosphere. For decades Apra has bowed to this political fact and instead of presenting its own candidate has achieved power through such unassailable and respected personages as José Luis Bustamante y Rivero.[4] Another question is whether Apra will continue its present coexistence policies with capital, perhaps supporting Beltrán or Carrillo Smith. This worked in 1956 but now those Apristas who are in an alliance forming mood may be more impressed with the strength of Fernando Belaunde Terry--the man who snagged away many of the younger Apristas' votes in 1956 in spite of the party line.

Odría may continue his campaign to the end, relying on his acceptability to capital and the interest of the mass vote. Or, realizing his basic weakness and the antagonism of the Apristas, he may also settle for an alliance. In such an alliance he might or might not emerge as the candidate. Most probably--unless he becomes stronger than at present--an alliance would take the form of shifting his supporters to another candidate who would be able to convince Odría that he would contiuue the policies of Odría's former administration (as Odría had hoped of Lavalle in 1956) and would protect Odría's name.[5]

For these reasons it would be presumptuous as well as probably mistaken to attempt to say what ideology the Peruvian people will chose in 1962. It is more to the point to wonder what choice of ideologies will remain by July 1962.

The Possible Candidates and Their Beliefs

If it is difficult to write about a campaign without parties it is doubly difficult to write about the firm convictions of candidates who have every reason for hiding their convictions. For reasons indicated above none of the candidates will be elected by virtue of his stand on currency stability, agrarian reform, public housing, or other vital national issues. Someone will be elected because of the political deals he is able to make and because of a vague popularity that comes with a good public presence, an accident turned to good advantage such as Odría's ill-starred attempt to break up a Belaunde rally in 1956--making Belaunde a popular figure overnight; or oratorical abilities which can stir crowds without saying anything important. All that is neces-

[4] President of Peru from 1945 to 1948. He was recently appointed a Justice of the World Court.

[5] The Christian Democrats recently embarrassed Odría by breaking a secret 1956 agreement under which Odría promised free elections in return for, among other things, legislative approval of budgets enacted by decree during his administration. The Christian Democrats sparked a revolt in the Chamber of Deputies before it recessed March 22, and led the voting 74 to 24 to censure Odría's 1955-56 national budget. They followed the attack by publishing a list of real estate and automobiles allegedly acquired by Odría in Peru as personal property and invited him to explain how he could have accumulated the property on an official annual salary of $15,000.

sary is to be against foreign intervention, hunger, and Ecuador's territorial claims; and to be for national sovereignty, "agrarian reform," public housing, and bread for all. It is unnecessary to present a program for the accomplishment of these ends, in fact it is undesirable because it would lead to compromising statements. Anything which might affect a future bargaining position is better left unsaid. The lack of debate on issues of grave public concern is reminiscent of the United States in the late 19th century when the vital problems were passed over in a flood of irrelevant oratory.

Fernando Belaunde Terry

Belaunde is the candidate who conforms most closely to the above description. He is a handsome forty-nine-year-old. When he was twelve his father and family were deported for political reasons. He studied architecture in France and the United States and eventually returned to practice in Lima. He was elected a deputy in 1945.

In 1956 he made an eleventh-hour decision to enter the presidential race against Manuel Prado and Hernando de Lavalle. Odría, considering him an upstart, barred his name from the ballots and broke up a rally in the Plazuela La Merced. Partisans promptly marched on the Presidential Palace and forced Odría--who was frantically trying to accomplish the contrary ends of holding a free election and of limiting the candidates to those he found acceptable--to place Belaunde's name on the ballot. Belaunde staged a giant demonstration in the traditional Plaza San Martín and campaigned vigorously in the provinces. On election day Prado and Belaunde left the Government candidate, Lavalle, far behind. Prado, even with his Apra alliance, won only by a small margin over Belaunde.

In 1959 when Prado's Government was in such difficult straits that he found it necessary to suspend many civil liberties including the right of assembly, Belaunde decided to disregard the injunction and hold an AP congress and demonstration in Arequipa. In the best Michael Innes style he hired an automobile and had himself driven to Arequipa disguised in a chullo (an indigenous knitted cap with large ear flaps) and dark glasses. He was, predictably, arrested and returned to Lima where he was briefly interned in the island fortress of El Frontón. There he compounded the comedy by an attempted escape, swimming to the yacht of an unfriendly legislator, who promptly returned him to the island. He was released a few days later. A number of his former followers found it difficult to continue to take him seriously.

Recently he has stepped up his campaign and is apparently gaining new strength. His first political treatise, The Conquest of Peru by the Peruvians, has been supplemented by a second, Town by Town. The former focuses on developmental plans mainly on the eastern side of the Andes. It is richly embellished with architectural drawings but contains no practical program for

raising the necessary funds or for the final disposition of the developments. Belaunde himself talks equally vaguely about agrarian reform. The latter book is largely a collection of photographs of Belaunde appearing in distant corners of Peru. He has made a series of tours to places never before visited by a presidential candidate and his book may be an effective way of emphasizing his peregrinations. The text, however, is anecdotal and concerned with such subjects as ancient irrigation systems of preconquest Peru. One looks in vain for a political program.

It is safe to say, however, that however unformed his ideas they incline more to the Left than to the Right. He has promised a "revolution" if he is defrauded in the 1962 elections. One person wrote that Belaunde's definition of fraud is anything which might elect another candidate. He has only indirect connections with the wealthy families of Peru who represent the extreme right. Essentially he appears to be a man inclined to liberal ideas without a full understanding of the framework in which these ideas operate in other countries, nor of how they could be introduced in Peru without igniting the tinderbox. Neither does he make a clear distinction between liberalism as it functions with controls in a democratic society and the "liberalism" of Fidelismo and communism. He has coquettishly made advances to the latter factions in Peru but, again, without so far committing himself that an isolated far right would prod the army to intervene.

Pedro Beltrán Espantoso

Beltrán, sixty-four, is the ideal person to qualify the overly neat picture of a presidential candidate given above. Being the editor and largest owner of La Prensa he has been outspoken and has committed himself to positions from which he cannot retreat. His main ideological views have already been given--a liberalism which is basically that of the England of 1918, but uncontaminated by the new fangled ideas of John Maynard Keynes. His interest in agrarian reform dates from his presidency (1927-34) of the National Agrarian Society. His first display of fiscal management was as president of the Central Reserve Bank in 1930. His ties with and interest in the United States were strengthened when he was Ambassador in Washington during the first government of Manuel Prado (1939-45).

Although he has been careful not to display it publicly, Beltrán is a driving, ambitious man. Despite the polite disclaimers in his New Year's Day interview there is no doubt that, if he could win the support of any substantial bloc, his hat would be in the ring and he would be off campaigning as doggedly as anyone. His friends well know how long he has nursed the desire to be president, and they know his frustrations in being so close--as a premier who is running the country in all but name--and yet not to have the final responsibility or credit.

There is much reason to believe that Beltrán could have the support of the Pradistas, although Carrillo Smith--equally ambitious--might give him some competition. But this would do Beltrán little good because the Pradistas are numerically small and sufficiently discredited. His realistic hope is that the Pradistas' acute concern for the continuance of Beltrán's conservative and fiscally successful economic policies, and the Apristas' deep entanglement in coexistence, will force a continued alliance between Apra and capitalists of the Right, with Beltrán as their candidate. The extent of Apra's entanglement is apparent in Haya de la Torre's statement--in a speech to a huge assembly in the Plaza San Martín shortly after his arrival in February--that political coexistence has demonstrated the maturity of Apra. Although Haya is constantly saying that it is not Apra which has changed, but X (the particular situation previously condemned and now applauded), it is clear that the older leaders of Apra have swung far from their fire-eating days of the '30's. The question is whether these old men can still control the organization and votes of a new generation of Apristas, themselves badly divided. And there is considerable doubt whether, even with organized Apra support, Beltrán could overcome the dislike and distrust of the non-Aprista masses. But Beltrán has the refreshing characteristic of standing foursquare, and if he gets the chance the fight will be a rough one.

Manuel Seoane

Seoane, an old-time Aprista and presently Peru's Ambassador to Chile, has long been the active head of Apra in Peru and stands in party rank only inferior to Haya de la Torre. For convenience he is given here as the Apra candidate because at this time there is no way of foretelling that the two developments which would have to precede his candidacy will occur. First, the policy of coexistence would have to be abandoned, after all the justifications of it made over the last five years to doubting Apristas. If coexistence were not abandoned it is difficult to believe that either capital or the army would allow Beltrán to be set aside and an Aprista run as head of a coalition ticket. Apra would have to run alone, or look in other directions for its pacts. In its weakened state, a pact with any other group, the Belaundistas for example, would mean yielding the ultimate plum and settling for another kind of coexistence. Second, Haya de la Torre would have to definitely remove himself from the race. He has been coy in his speeches, but judging from past performance and the extremely brief time he spent in Peru (off to Japan in March) there is little doubt that his desire for the presidency is weak.

It is difficult for me to describe the ideological position of the coexistence Apristas, of which Seoane is spokesman. It is not because they have not made declarations of their position--these have been abundant. But in spite of Haya's and others' splendid oratory and vivid writing I have difficulty following their bridge across the gulf between such prior dogmatic systems as expounded in Haya's Thirty Years of Aprismo, and the new look of coexist-

ence with the powers once so savagely attacked. It may be that everything has changed except Apra, but I find the opposite explanation more credible.

In speeches on March 12 in Chimbote and Trujillo, Haya attacked Fidelismo and "violence."[6] Yet it would be difficult to deny that Apra, previous to 1956, was closer kin in ends and means to Fidelismo (without the Communist ties) than to the wealth-dominated Government of Manuel Prado. Haya made one revealing statement in Trujillo, his birthplace and the city he describes as the cradle of Apra: "The vehement desire of Aprismo is to leave the name of its party written in the history of Peru." On February 22 Haya de la Torre became sixty-six years old. One of his early battle cries was, "Young men to work, old men to the grave." Perhaps he feels a sense of history closing in on himself and on his creation. This sense permeates recent Apra speeches and writings--explanation of the past and justification of the present. Gone, since 1956, is a sense of the future.

Hernando de Lavalle García

Lavalle has not declared his candidacy, as have none of the others mentioned here except Belaunde and Odría. Under ordinary circumstances he would be a lightweight contender, but the circumstances may not be ordinary. He is sixty-five, and a respected and well-connected lawyer and former professor of the University of San Marcos. He was president of the Students Federation in 1919. In 1922, the year after receiving his law degree, he was appointed Professor of Finance and Financial Legislation at the unusually tender age of twenty-six. Both the appointment and his undoubted command of the subject may be associated with the fact that his family is among the wealthier of Peru.

From 1946 to 1948 he was dean of the College of Lawyers and also president of the Inter-American Federation of Lawyers. He has not been politically active in the sense of holding office, but as a man of wealth he has been immersed in politics as a matter of course. As mentioned above he was chosen by Manuel Odría in 1956 to be the candidate charged with carrying on the outgoing Government's policies. He was well known to capital and the politicians but unknown to the people. Since none of his rallies were broken up by Odría's hose trucks he remained a colorless figure. He also angled for Apra support but was beaten at the game by Manuel Prado. Thus, although the heavy favorite of men of property, he ran a far third behind Belaunde and Prado.

His political outlook can be described as that of a Mark Hanna Republi-

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[6] An Aprista had been killed the previous day by Luis de la Puente, leader of the "Rebel Apristas"--a Castro-sympathizing group described in Fidelismo in Peruvian Universities, Part I: A New Platform for Old Causes (RWP-2-'61), an AUFS publication.

can. He sincerely believes that the wealthy few of the country are decent, trustworthy people who act in the interest of the nation. If their wealth is disproportionate it must be for a reason. If it is not divine providence, it must be superior ability, education, and breeding. Lavalle now devotes most of his energies to his banking interests, and shares the opinion--widespread in the United States before 1929--that bankers are sober, well-intentioned men well equipped to exercise their enormous and lucrative power. He feels about the banks as McKinley felt about the large manufacturers--whatever serves them serves the nation.

If he should decide to run in 1962, as it is widely believed he will, he would have no chance without something entirely unexpected happening. But that is all the more reason for not ruling him out at this point.

Carlos Carrillo Smith

Lawyer, Pradista, and fifty years old, he served as Prado's Minister of Government until he was forced to resign in October 1960 because of mistreatment of five engineering students by Lima police.

His career is rather similar to Lavalle's in that he also received his law degree at San Marcos and is now Professor of Administrative Law in the Catholic University. Besides his period as minister he has also held public office as secretary-general of the National Elections Board in 1945, and again from 1950 to 1958. He had an inside and personal view of presidential elections, having organized and presided over the elections which brought José Luis Bustamante y Rivero and Manuel Prado to office, both, incidentally, by Apra support.

The political views he has expressed differ little from those of Prado or Beltrán, or for that matter, from Lavalle. He is another of the possible candidates who would protect the prerogatives of capital, who has little support from the masses, who in the normal course of events stands little chance of the presidency, but who must be considered until the votes are counted and the new president is safely installed in his palace.

General of Division (ret.) Manuel A. Odría Amoretty

Of all the candidates there is none whose position can be more easily surmised than Odría's. There is no reason to believe his ideas have changed since his former administration. His speeches following his return to Peru, March 26, show a determination to defend his former policies and, if elected, to continue them.

For capital this means the benefits and problems of a relatively uncon-

trolled economy. It was Odría, shortly after assuming power, who ordered a study of the economy which was failing rapidly under Bustamante y Rivero and the Apristas, and who implemented the recommendations by freeing the exchange rate and abandoning other controls. Fortunately for Peru this coincided with the Korea crisis, the prices of Peruvian exports rose, and the economy prospered. Some of the proceeds of the prosperity went into public works: the great Santa Valley hydroelectric plant, the iron reduction furnaces and steel mill of Chimbote, the Employees Hospital of Lima (probably the largest in South America), a vast new Ministry of Education building, an impressive football stadium, many public housing units, schools, roads, the irrigation of Quiroz, and so on.

For the poorer classes his policies meant low unemployment and a real wage which was higher than the present real wage under Beltrán's austerity.

Politically Odría relentlessly pursued the Apristas. Because of several assassinations of public figures, apparently by Apristas, and an abortive Aprista revolt meant to remove Bustamante from the Presidency, Odría considered Apristas criminals rather than guilty of merely political mistakes. Haya de la Torre was kept penned in the Colombian Embassy in Lima for five years before he was given safe conduct out of the country. Apra was declared illegal, the party and its unions driven underground. Odría did not hesitate to curtail civil liberties when he believed the situation was becoming unstable. He was always at odds with the university students. Elections were held in 1950, but they were controlled to allow Odría to exchange his title of "President of the Military Junta of Government" for that of "Constitutional President of the Republic." He was a dictator in every sense until late in his term when he began allowing the press greater freedom, and finally held free elections. That the results of the elections were respected probably had nothing to do with Odría's breaking a bone in his leg on election eve which required treatment outside the country.

Odría, however, must be distinguished from caudillos such as Perón, Pinilla, and Pérez Jiménez. Odría did not rule by personal whim, but acted on the influence if not the orders of the wealthy. He has a personal sense of honor and responsibility, and while there was undoubtedly corruption in his Government, as there seems to be in every Latin American Government, it was not on the massive scale of other dictators interested only in their own enrichment.

Today Odría, the Odrí-istas, and many of the poor, believe that material works outweigh mere social problems. The day before Odría left for his tour of the north I talked with one of his main lieutenants in the UNO Casa Política--the man responsible for the Odría organization of northern Peru. This urbane gentleman answered my questions courteously and at length. I asked what don Manuel considered the gravest problem facing a new president. The answer, unsurprisingly, was "agrarian reform."

I, thinking of the tremendous social problems which had precipitated agrarian reform in Bolivia and of the revolutionary social consequences which flowed from it, asked, "What does don Manuel propose to do about agrarian reform?"

The answer, surprising but consistent, "We propose to build more large irrigation works, to reclaim the land of the desert, to provide land for those who want to work it." (This was the plan for Quiroz, but the newly irrigated land had fallen into the hands of the already large landowners of Piura.)

I replied, "But the majority of the population without land is in the sierra. What do you propose to do with the large latifundios?"

"We will build irrigation projects on the coast and in the sierra. Without affecting existing property holdings, new land can be made available."

Only a man from the coast or a man with political motives could make so unrealistic a statement. The lands of the sierra are already seriously overcrowded, and the Quechua-speaking population is growing. The valley lands are held by latifundios and cultivated for the benefit of the patrón. He uses Indian labor and does not pay for it. Only as long as the Indian spends three days a week working for the patrón is he given the privilege of scratching a living from a hillside plot. The land-famished Indians have, even before the coming of the Spaniards, pushed these plots up sheer mountainsides to what would be considered impossible altitudes in areas farther from the equator. Agriculture is practiced to the highest limits it is climatically possible to farm. And still above this are the grazing lands which extend to the formidably high snow line. Anyone who speaks of opening new land by irrigation in the sierra can mean only fabulously expensive projects which would yield only a minor increment in production on land already cultivated.

I asked how the projects would be paid for.

"The new land will not be given away, plots will be sold to the small farmers who want to buy them."

Again, the answer is without meaning for the sierra where "small farmers" are peons who do not see more than a few dollars of cash from one year to the next. It is almost as meaningless for the coast where the landless field hands earn an average of 50 cents a day, and support a family of five to six persons when a piece of bread the size of a biscuit costs 1.5 cents, a pound of soupbones 20 cents, one egg 5 cents. Such a person could purchase land only with a generous credit system amortized over many years. My friend had not considered this aspect.

It is very doubtful that Odría could win on the basis of his strength among the voters. It is true he was well received on his arrival at the Lima

airport, at Piura (largely controlled by landowners he has benefited), and at the small town of Tumbes near the Ecuadorian border (where Odría first made himself a hero in 1941 by invading Ecuador all the way to Santa Rosa). But there were vigorous anti-Odría countermanifestations in the large northern cities of Trujillo and Chiclayo when Odría stopped briefly on his way to the carefully prepared program of Piura. Even in Piura an open-air luncheon given Odría by Teodoro Balareza Lizarraburu at his Hacienda Tacalá was marred by a group chanting "Vi-va A-pra" at the gates. At the conclusion of the luncheon Odría made a hasty visit to the once prosperous fishing town of Paita. The people of Paita, now fallen on evil days, booed (actually, whistled) Odría and someone was unkind enough to splatter him with a can of red paint.

I was interested to see what would happen to Odría on April 18 when he was to visit the politically conscious and prosperous (but not so prosperous as it once was) oil town of Talara. I was there early, watching the nervous preparations of the Talara Odría committee. They finally decided not to have the reception (on Odría's return from Tumbes) in the town itself, but on the highway outside. He would speak in the town only if an attempted parade through the outskirts made it seem propitious. Then they sat down to wait. They were still waiting when one of the members telephoned a point on the highway, and discovered that Odría had continued south on the Pan American highway without stopping at the Talara road, and without notifying his committee. This was probably wise of him. Apra is strong in Talara, and Belaunde also drew large crowds on his visit in 1956. Also Odría has thus far ducked the politically hot issue of immediate versus eventual nationalization of the oil properties which support Talara. He would not have gotten away from a public assembly without being forced to declare himself because the Talareños are strongly against immediate nationalization.

But Odría, even less than other candidates who cannot win by their own popularity at the polls, must not be dismissed from consideration. He is still the ex-army man, supported by the army--although some factionalism exists within it. He is acceptable to most of capital, and capital must eventually focus on a single strong candidate if it hopes to win, rather than disperse its strength among Beltrán, Lavalle, and Carrillo Smith.

To repeat once more: the Peruvian elections of 1962 will be won only indirectly at the polls. The real precipitation of political factions will take place only shortly before elections. The combinations which can be formed are unpredictable. Reason would tell us that the only alliance which could not take place would be one between Odría and Apra. But then reason would remind us that there is nothing so unlikely that it could not take place between now and 1962.

The Fight Before the Storm

The campaign in any case will be hard fought and hard won. The can-

didates will be appealing to all sectors and all sectors will feel a very personal and pocketbook interest in the winner.

Well and good, we might say--the political atmosphere will be cleared, positions shaken down to first principles, and issues will be defined and joined. But . . . .

Nearly half the population, the Quechua-speakers of the sierra and the Aymará of the Altiplano, do not participate in elections. They have no part in national life except as serfs in the latifundio system. Peru is one of the last nations on earth to preserve this system, and Peru preserves it because so large a part of its population is caught up in it. A real agrarian reform--the abolition of the latifundios--would not be the adjustment which agrarian reform was, say in the Philippines, it would be an out and out revolution on the scale of that of Bolivia.

Yet reform is in the air. It is very much on the minds of all the serious candidates, regardless of how impracticable their approaches to it are. It is also becoming increasingly important in the minds of the Indians themselves. Indian uprisings and demands such as those of Lauramarca[7] were once few, far between, and easily put down. Such "incidents" now take place the length and breadth of the sierra, on the coast, and on the Altiplano. Few are co-ordinated, many are led by Spanish-speakers for reasons of their own. They are not yet a serious threat to the state.

It takes a certain meeting of minds to crystallize an idea "in the air" to practical, concerted action. Government leaders must be introduced to the gravity of the problem which they are thinking about in superficial terms. The Indians must absorb the idea that the system in which they live will not endure for all time, that Spanish-speakers have some of the same thoughts as they (though the Spaniards would call them fears), that revolt against the system is not a revolt against the laws of God and destiny, and above all, that it is physically possible to do away with the latifundios and farm one's own land without obligation to any other person.

Most of the prospective candidates have already been introduced to the gravity of the problem. If they speak about agrarian reform in moderate terms it is because they realize they can no longer stick their heads in the sand and leave their bodies exposed to the whirlwind. They also realize that speaking about agrarian reform in realistic terms--the discussion of actual ways and means, the underscoring of specific problems, the acknowledgment of the Indian's state of mind--can itself bring the dreaded calamity. Thus the reassuring talk of colonization, resettlement, irrigation works, and the protection of property.

The moderation of the candidates, however, will depend on how quickly

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[7] See The Indian Emergence in Cuzco (RWP-8-'58), an AUFS publication.

they can sort themselves out, drop the dangerous issues, and get back on the safe ground of debating how much money Odría stole in 1955. And then only if such issues as agrarian reform are not beyond dropping. I mentioned above that it is nearly impossible to get into a serious discussion of the nation without having Peruvians themselves bring up agrarian reform and its revolutionary consequences. Wealthy Peruvians are enough aware of the situation that they generally favor a reform which they hope can be moderate. They want a firecracker that will give a sense of change without triggering the big explosion that would transform Peru. And they want a candidate who can do the trick.

It would be no small trick. The agriculture of the sierra is so far out of phase with the rest of the country that any tampering would be as likely to cause its complete overturn as to effect the hoped for adjustment. The delicately balanced national economy would not survive a revolution in the sierra, nor, in all probability would the present democratic political forms.

Agrarian reform is not the only cloud on the not-too-far horizon. The urban poor are restless and greatly concerned about one of the issues that most candidates have accepted: housing. They are also concerned about problems which the candidates have not yet chosen to speak about: unemployment, low wages, and the relatively high cost of living. A successful candidate will have to promise much. The poverty-striken of Lima will not be slow to measure performance against promise. If performance does not measure up, there is little doubt that the Fidelismo which is reaching out from the universities to the workers will be given added impetus.

I have the feeling that in trying to amend common beliefs about Peru I have stated a rather bald case. I do not mean to leave the impression that 1962 will bring revolution to Peru. But in the face of the optimistic reports recently given by Guggenheim representatives, the Arthur D. Little Company of Cambridge, The New York Times of March 6 ("Development of 'High Jungle' Peru's Hope for Economic Spur"), and even the London Times of April 27 ("Modern Lima Acquires a Streamlined Look--Colonial Styles Ousted by Glass and Concrete"), someone must give the larger picture within which these developments are taking place or may take place.

Peru is a little like one of the old, battered channel steamers laboriously put back together on the Altiplano and still making daily trips between Puno and Guaqui over the smooth waters of Lake Titicaca. The steamer has a sparkling new coat of paint, electricity has been installed, the superstructure is bright and shining. But far below, seldom seen by the outsider, is an ancient, patched-up, motive force which won't last a second 50 years. The waters of our political Titicaca have seemed untroubled of late, and the storm of '62 may prove but a squall which our steamer can take in stride as it has for so many years past. But if the storm lives up to the clouds that are flying before it the old ship may need some major repairs before it enters the rough waters.

Richard W. Patch